Western Europe and Canada: Economic Links with Libya

Country Sections

P&PD

	25 X 1
EUR M86-20001	
	25 X 1
	EUR M86-20001

Canada

Economic Relations with Libya

Canada's total trade with Libya (exports plus imports) has averaged only US \$110 million annually over the last four years-less than 0.1 percent of overall Canadian trade. Exports fell from \$96 million in 1982 to an estimated \$56 million in 1985, while imports rose from \$18 million to \$56 million. Canada's primary exports are wheat--accounting for 35 percent of Libyan wheat imports in the past three years--evaporated milk, and machinery used in the energy sector. Oil accounts for virtually all of Canada's imports from Libya, but this oil supplies less than I percent of Canadian oil consumption and could easily be replaced by domestic supplies. The vast majority of the approximately 1300 Canadians in Libya are oil workers from the province of Alberta--where US companies frequently recruit for operations in Libya

25X1

Over recent years, Ottawa has sought to keep Libya at arm's length. It has no permanent diplomatic presence in Libya--Canada's ambassador to Tunisia is also accredited to Libya. Moreover, it has refused to permit the opening of a student liaison office to serve the several hundred Libyan students attending school in Canada. Furthermore, no flight service between Canada and Libya exists, and there is already a quota on the number of Libyan students allowed in Canada. Canada also has imposed controls that prohibit the export of all military goods. as well as such strategic equipment as civilian aircraft.

25X1

Canadian Support for US Sanctions

Following President Reagan's announcement of economic sanctions against Libya, an unauthorized statement by a spokesman for £anada's External Affairs Ministry indicated that Ottawa would not join in an economic boycott because Canada's economic stake in Libya was so small that it would have little leverage to exercise through economic sanctions. External Affairs officials, however, did ask firms operating in Libya not to replace departing US personnel.

On 10 January, Prime Minister Mulroney announced new measures after a Cabinet meeting. He stressed that they were Canada's response to a moral issue and were not linked to President Reagan's request. The measures include the following:

- -- All government aid to Canadian firms doing business in Libya will be cut off.
- -- No insurance coverage will be provided by the Export Development Corporation on new business activities of Canadian companies in Libya.

export of oil drilling ed Western technology. Other	special export control stop new contracts for the quipment containing unique er products to be covered by determined in consultation with
Mulroney again urged Canadians not departing Americans. External Afthe measures could lose Canadian to business.	fairs Minister Clark estimated
These steps represent a subst	anctions. We think Canada will
be reluctant to take further step	S ,
In fact, Mulroney, employed be broadly based and coordinated	hasized that further steps must

Canada

Data Sheet

Exports to Libya

	<u>1981</u>	<u>1985</u>
Value, \$million	61	56
Percent of total exports	.13	.07

Commodity Composition - 1984

		Share of
	<u>Value</u>	<u>Total(%)</u>
Total Exports	56	.07
Agriculture	30	.32
Raw Materials	0	.02
Fuels	0	.01
Manufactures	26	.06
Chemicals	0	.00
Semi-Finished Goods	0	.00
Machinery	23	.29
Transport Equipment	3	.01
Consumer Goods	1	.02
Other	0	.01

Imports of Oil from Libya 1

	<u>1981</u>	<u>1985</u>
Gross value, \$ million	125	40
Net volume, 1,000 b/d	7	5
Net imports as a share of total oil consumption (%)	0.4	0.4

Workers in Libya

Number: 1,300

Job Categories: Almost all are oil workers.

See note at end.

Canada

(Data Sheet continued)

Arms Deliveries to Libya

1981

<u>1985</u>

Value, \$million

5

0

Investment in Libya

No specific information, probably very small, if any.

Libyan Investment in Canada

No information

Libyan Debt Owed Canada

No information

Major Companies Operating in Libya

No Canadian oil companies are operating in Libya.

25X1

Economic Relations with Libya

\$600 million in 1985. Britain's main import from Libya is a small amount of oil--about 3 percent of total UK consumption in 1985--which Britain could easily replace from alternative Middle East suppliers. Although London broke diplomatic ties with Tripoli in 1984, imports of Libyan oil doubled last year to about 50,000 b/d. According to the British press, much of this oil is being refined in Britain and re-exported to the US. British exports to Libya have fallen continuously since 1981 and consist mainly of machinery used in oil production. Since April 1984, the Export Credit Guarantee Department has refused to provide insurance for major new contracts in Libya. There currently are approximately 5,000 British nationals working in Libya, mainly in the oil industry.

Data Sheet

Exports to Libya

	<u>1981</u>	<u>1985</u>
Value, \$million	1.067	281
Percent of total exports	1.04	.29

Commodity Composition - 1984

by composition and		Share of
	<u>Value</u>	Total(%)
Total Exports	330	.35
Agriculture	21	.32
Raw Materials	1	.02
Fuels	2	.01
Manufactures	303	.50
Chemicals	54	.49
Semi-Finished Goods	59	.61
Machinery	133	.22
Transport Equipment	35	.43
Consumer Goods	22	.22
Other	3	.15

Imports of Oil from Libya 1

	1981	1985
Gross value, \$ million	133	500
Net volume, 1,000 b/d	9	51
Net imports as a share of total oil consumption (%)	.6	3.0

Workers in Libya

Number: 5,000 Job Categories: Mostly oil and construction workers.

¹ See note at end.

· (Data Sheet continued)

Arms Deliveries to Libya

<u>1981</u> <u>1985</u>

Value, \$million

0

0

London banned new defense sales to Libya in 1984.

Investment in Libya

Most direct investment ended when British Petroleum and other British oil companies left the country in 1969.

Libyan Investment in the United Kingdom

The state-owned Wahda Bank, through its small interest in an Arab bank, owns 29 percent of a British brokerage house. That share will rise to 100 percent next March when new regulations take effect.

Libyan Debt Owed the United Kingdom

About \$200 million in outstanding debt. Libya has begun to pay off outstanding bills in the UK owed to commercial firms, hospitals, and universities.

Major Companies Operating in Libya

British companies have been awarded about half of the consultancy contracts for Libya's major civil engineering projects.

Company	<u>Activity</u>
John Brown Offshore	Project manager for Libya's offshore Bouri oil field
The Weir Group Ltd.	Engineering firm; in 1984 sold hydraulic pumps and associated equipment worth more than \$1 million to Libya.
Brown and Root, UK	Provides project management services for the Great Man-made River water pipeline.

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(Data Sheet continued)

Motherwell Bridge Constructors

In 1984, was awarded two contracts involving storage tank projects; work to be carried out by Motherwell's Geneva-based sister company, Cepco.

Tilden Industries

In 1984, was negotiating a \$15.2 million contract to supply prefabricated housing equipment to a West German firm operating in Libya.

Occidential Oil and Continental Oil

UK subsidiaries of the American firms have provided services related to the Oasis project for their parent companies.

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	25 X 1
Polatum Luvombouna	
Belgium-Luxembourg	
Economic Relations with Libya	
Belgian-Libyan economic relations are insignificant at the present time. The value of Belgian-Luxembourg exports to Libya has fallen off substantially since the early 1980s and amounted to only about \$68 million last yearabout 0.1 percent of total exports. Preliminary data indicate that Belgium also dramatically cut back its oil imports from Libya last year, and relied on Libya for less than 1 percent of its oil consumption.	
	25 X 1
Although an economic, industrial and technological cooperation agreement was signed last May, Brussels is still at loggerheads with Tripoli over a section of the agreement callin for increased bilateral nuclear cooperation, especially in constructuring two nuclear reactors. Qadhafi has threatened to cancel the entire agreement unless Brussels ratifies the nuclea	g
accord.	•
	25X1
	25 X 6
	25 X 1

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Belgium-Luxemb	ourg	
Data Sheet		
Exports to Libya		
	1981	1985
Value, \$million	383	68
Percent of total exports	1.36	.44
Commodity Composition - 1984		
	<u>Value</u>	Share of Total(%
Total Exports	104	.20
Agriculture Raw Materials Fuels Manufactures Chemicals Semi-Finished Goods Machinery Transport Equipment Consumer Goods	23 1 10 69 8 26 17 18 17	.14 .03 .24 .19 .11 .21 .37 .30
Other	2	.05
Imports of Oil from Libya ¹		
•	1981	1985
Gross value, \$ million	101	20
Net volume, 1,000 b/d	2	3
<pre>Net imports as a share of total oil consumption (%)</pre>	. 5	.6
Workers in Libya		
Number: negligible Job Categories: NA		
$^{ m 1}$ See note at end.		

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					25 X 1
	<u>_B</u>	elgium-Lu	xembourg		
	(D a	ta Sheet	continued)		
Arms	Deliveries to Libya	<u>1981</u>	1985	~	
	Value, \$million	0	0		
Inve	stment in Libya				
	No information				
Liby	an Investment in Bel	gium-Luxe	mbourg		
	No information				•
Liby	an Debt Owed Belgium	-Luxembou	rg		
	No information				
Majo	r Companies Operatin	g in Liby	a.		
_	Company		Activity		
•	Belgonucleaire		monitoring un Furnished the Research Cent (1982). Nego	Tajura Nuclear er Library	
	Agfa-Gevaert NV		Supplies scient	ntific equipment rogram.	
	Philip's Industrie	N V	Technical ass electronics R		
	Prodemco Ltd.		Consulting for projects.	r military	
	Tractionel Electrobe Engineering	e 1		for power station pumping station	
					25X1
				1	25 X 1

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	25 X 1
The Netherlands	
Economic Relations with Libya	
Dutch-Libyan economic relations are limited. Dutch exports to Libya have dropped since 1983 to about \$140 million last year, or 2 percent of total Dutch exports. Exports consist mainly of agricultural products and technology, construction materials, and chemicals. Primary Dutch imports from Libya are oil and oil products, amounting to roughly \$500 million in 1985. Dutch dependence on Libyan oil peaked in 1983 at 14 percent of total oil consumption and fell to 8 percent in 1985. Several Dutch oil companiesincluding Royal Dutch Shellcurrently operate in Libya, employing about 400 Dutch citizens involved in services related to energy exploration.	25 X 1
Prior to the recent bombings in Vienna and Rome, the US Embassy reported that the Dutch were negotiating an agreement	
with Libya on trade and investment which The Hague hoped to sign early this year. The agreement is part of an ongoing effort by The Hague to normalize its relations with the Arab world which	
were disrupted by the 1973-74 embargo.	25 X 1
	25 X 6
	25 X 1

Netherlands

Data Sheet

Exports to Libya

	<u>1981</u>	<u>1985</u>
Value, \$million	267	143
Percent of total exports	.39	.22

Commodity Composition - 1984

29 00 11 01 230 1		Share of
	<u>Value</u>	<u>Total(%)</u>
Total Exports	186	.28
Agriculture	103	.77
Raw Materials Fuels	8	.03 .06
Manufactures Chemicals	54 17	.16 .15
Semi-Finished Goods	11	.17
Machinery Transport Equipment	13 6	.16 .28
Consumer Goods	7	.16
Other	19	5.30

Imports of Oil from Libya 1

	<u>1981</u>	<u>1985</u>
Gross value, \$ million	232	500
Net volume, 1,000 b/d	18	49
Net imports as a share of total oil consumption (%)	2.6	8.5

Workers in Libya

Number: 400 Job Categories: Most are probably oil workers.

¹ See note at end.

<u>N 6</u>	etherlands		
(Data S	heet continued	1)	
Arms Deliveries to Libya	1981	1985	
Value, \$million	0	0	
Investment in Libya			
No information			
Libyan Investment in the Neth	herlands		
No information			•
Libyan Debt Owed the Netherla	ands		
Outstanding loans and ur	npaid bills pr	obably total at least	
\$40 million			
	Libya		
\$40 million Major Companies Operating in Company		<u>ivity</u>	
Major Companies Operating in	Act		
Major Companies Operating in <u>Company</u>	<u>Act</u> 0il 0il	<u>ivity</u>	
Major Companies Operating in Company Royal Dutch Shell Thyssen (subsidiary of Thyssen Brennkraft, GMB)	Act Oil Oil	<u>ivity</u> exploration.	
Major Companies Operating in Company Royal Dutch Shell Thyssen (subsidiary of Thyssen Brennkraft, GMB) Germany)	Act Oil Oil	ivity exploration. equipment Sales	
Major Companies Operating in Company Royal Dutch Shell Thyssen (subsidiary of Thyssen Brennkraft, GMB) Germany)	Act Oil Oil	ivity exploration. equipment Sales	
Major Companies Operating in Company Royal Dutch Shell Thyssen (subsidiary of Thyssen Brennkraft, GMB) Germany)	Act Oil Oil	ivity exploration. equipment Sales	2
Major Companies Operating in Company Royal Dutch Shell Thyssen (subsidiary of Thyssen Brennkraft, GMB) Germany)	Act Oil Oil	ivity exploration. equipment Sales	2
Major Companies Operating in Company Royal Dutch Shell Thyssen (subsidiary of Thyssen Brennkraft, GMB) Germany)	Act Oil Oil	ivity exploration. equipment Sales	2

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France

Economic Relations with Libya

In France's view, the main threat from Libya is Qadhafi's meddling in Chad, not terrorism. Since the Libyan invasion of Chad in 1983, France--while not willing to cut off economic relations entirely--has reduced its economic ties with Libya to the point where they are of minimal importance to the French economy. French officials doubt the utility of economic sanctions and probably want to maintain some access to the Libyan market, both for commercial reasons and to try to preserve some form of influence over Tripoli.

25X1

Last year only about 0.2 percent of French exports went to Libya. On the other hand, France is still Libya's sixth largest supplier, down from third place five years ago. France provides equipment and servicing for oil production and large Libyan public works projects such as irrigation and building construction. Approximately 1200 French nationals, including dependents, live in Libya. In 1983 Paris banned further sales of offensive weapons to Tripoli, but continues to fulfill existing contracts for military-related equipment, primarily spare parts and training equipment. French imports from Libya consist almost entirely of petroleum, although this represents less than 3 percent of French oil consumption. French investment in Libya is minuscule, but Libyan arrearages on past contracts total between \$65 and \$130 million.

25X1

Possible Concessions

French officials are unlikely to be moved by US appeals for support in economic sanctions. Quite apart from France's perceptions of its own interests in the Middle East, the important elections due in March have made independence in foreign policy even more of a political touchstone than usual in France. We discount the possibility of France participating in a trade embargo or forcing its nationals to return home. The



France

Data Sheet

Exports to Libya

	<u>1981</u>	<u>1985</u>
Value, \$million	907	220
Percent of total exports	.85	.23

Commodity Composition - 1984

	<u>Share of</u>
<u>Value</u>	<u>Total</u> (%)
Total Exports 211	.23
Agriculture 8	.05 *
Raw Materials 1	.02
Fuels 8	.24
Manufactures 193	.40
Chemicals 26	.20
Semi-Finished Goods 53	.31
Machinery 73	.41
Transport Equipment 29	.21
Consumer Goods 12	.16
Other 0	.05

Imports of Oil from Libya¹

	<u>1981</u>	<u>1985</u>
Gross value, \$ million	502	600
Net volume, 1,000 b/d	33	63
Net imports as a share of total oil consumption	(%) 1.6	3.7

Workers in Libya

Number: 1200 (includes family members). Job Categories: Mostly sales personnel and oil workers.

¹ See note at end.

				25)
	Fra	nce		
	(Data Sheet	continued)		
Arms Deliveries to L	ibya		~	
	1981	1985		
Value, \$million	97	0		
				2
•				•
Investment in Libya				
No information				
Libyan Investment in	France			
No specific info	rmation, but	probably very sma	11.	
Libyan Debt Owed Fra	nce			
Arrearages probal		5 million.		
	the total ou	.tetandina daht ta	France	
We estimate that {arrearages, composition.) amounts to more		
farrearages, com	mercial debt;) amounts to more		
<pre>farrearages, com billion.</pre>	mercial debt;) amounts to more		
<pre>farrearages, comp billion. Major Companies Opera</pre>	mercial debt;	amounts to more	than \$1 1 parts for	
<pre>farrearages, commodilion. Major Companies Opera Company</pre>	mercial debt;	amounts to more /a Activity Fabricating stee	than \$1 l parts for ct. Italian firm	
<pre>farrearages, complian. Major Companies Opera</pre>	mercial debt;	<pre>Activity Fabricating stee irrigation proje Subcontractor to</pre>	than \$1 l parts for ct. Italian firm terminal.	
<pre>farrearages, commobillion. Major Companies Opera</pre>	mercial debt;	Activity Fabricating stee irrigation proje Subcontractor to building mooring University dormi	than \$1 l parts for ct. Italian firm terminal.	

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Fra	ance
(Data Sheet	t continued)
Societe Internationale de Dessalement	Desalination.
Elf Aquitaine	Oil services (exploration activities abandoned in 1984).
BBC Brown Boveri-France	Telecommunications.
Dassault .	Aircraft parts.
SNECMA	Aircraft parts.
Thomson	Military training equipment.

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	25X1
<u>West Germany</u>	
Paramia Dalakiana wikh libur	
Economic Relations with Libya	
West Germany is the second largest West European exporter to	
Libya, but its sales represent only about 0.3 percent of total	
West German exports. At least 30 large West German firms, plus	
many smaller ones, are known to be dealing with Libya. In	
addition to merchandise trade, there are press reports citing about \$800 million in construction projects currently underway by	
West German firms.	25X1
west derman i ii ms.	_0, ()
Libya is West Germany's third largest oil supplier,	
providing 14 percent of total oil imports. Two-thirds of the	
Libyan oil is purchased indirectly, however, either on the Rotterdam spot market or from US firms. West Germany would have	
little difficulty acquiring the oil it needs from other	
sources. On the other hand, most of West Germany's estimated	
\$110 million in investment in Libya is concentrated in the oil	
industry. Three West German oil companies operate in Libya; one •	
of them, VEBA, owns 17.5 percent of the former Mobil Oil concession. Most of the 1.500 West Germans in Libya are working	
for oil firms.	25X1
Payments to West German suppliers have slowed because of	
Libyan financial difficulties, and official export-insurance	25 X 1
coverage is strictly limited for West German firms selling to Libya.	
LIDYa.	25X1
Military	25 X 1
equipment deliveriesvery small over the last few yearsare now blocked.	25 X 1
Diocked.	23/1
Possible Concessions	
Bonn's response to the US decision to impose sanctions on	
Libya has not been encouraging, although the government's press spokesman commented that the West Germans support the US morally,	
favor increasing cooperation to combat terrorism, and will	
discourage West German firms from trying to gain commercial	
advantage from the US actions. The Kohl government, however, is	
undoubtedly aware that Washington will expect something more from	
Bonn, and it will be wary of seeming obstructionist on a matter of such importance to Washington. Moreover, the US Embassy	
reports a "surprising amount" of public pressure to "do	
something" about Libya, a tone reflected in much of the press	
commentary we have seen. In light of this, Bonn may consider	
taking action in several areas:	
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	25 X 1

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						25X ²
						25 X 6
						•
					·	
				•		
•						
						25 X 1

West Germany

Data Sheet

Exports to Libya

Exhauts to Finda		••
	<u>1981</u>	1985
Value, \$million	1,486	538
Percent of total exports	.84	.34
Commodity Composition - 1984		Share of
	<u>Value</u>	Total(%)
Total Exports	804	.47
Agriculture Raw Materials Fuels Manufactures Chemicals Semi-Finished Goods Machinery Transport Equipment Consumer Goods Other Imports of Oil from Libya ²	46 3 1 576 40 168 263 86 19	.48 ° .06 .02 .40 .17 .56 .59 .27 .13
TWOOLES OF OLL FLOW FLONG	1981	<u> 1985</u>
Gross value, \$ million	3,291	2,100
Net volume, 1,000 b/d	216	203
Net imports as a share	0 0	0.2

Workers in Libya

Number: 1,500

Job Categories: Mostly oil workers

of total oil consumption (%) 9.2

Some construction workers

9.2

¹ Of this amount, \$173 million is classified in the original German data as "electro-technical products."

See note at end.

West Germany

(Data Sheet continued)

Arms Deliveries to Libya

<u>1981</u> <u>1985</u>

Value, \$million

15

8

Investment in Libya

Economics Ministry estimates about \$110 million; mostly oil investments.

Libyan Investment in West Germany

No important Libyan investment in West Germany although some • banking interests.

Libyan Debt Owed West Germany

About \$3 billion in outstanding official export insurance. Unpaid bills are a major problem for West German firms dealing with Libya and probably total at least \$300 million.

Major Companies Operating in Libya

<u>Company</u> <u>Activity</u>	
-VEBA Owns 17.5 percent of former Mobil Oil concession.	
Deminex Has contract with Tripoli to explore for oil.	
Wintershall Oil production.	
Siemens Installed computer equipment at Tagura nuclear research facility and provided computer training for Libyans in West Germany as well as in Libya.	•
Blohm and Voss Floating dry dock.	
AEG-Kanis Power plant projects.	
Mannesmann Engineering for gas pipeline.	

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	West Germany	
(Data	a Sheet continued)	
MAN	Bus assembly plant.	
Philipp Holzmann	Desalination plant.	
Salzgitter Industrieb	oau Chemical project.	
		25X1
		•
•		

Italy

Economic Relations with Libya

Not surprisingly, Italy's economic ties with its former colony are far more significant than those of any other West European country. Although Italy has taken some encouraging steps this week, its close ties with Libya will be a strong disincentive against full-fledged sanctions.

- -- Although trade between the two countries has dropped sharply since 1981, total trade amounted to \$4.3 billion in 1985 and Libya was Italy's ninth largest trading partner. Libya provides about \$5 percent of Italy's oil imports.
- -- About 150 Italian companies, many of them government-controlled, have invested in Libya; they are led by the state-owned oil firm, AGIP, whose stake was estimated at \$700 million in 1984. Last year the company increased its interest in the Libyan oil industry by purchasing a 19-percent interest in the Bauri offshore oilfield.
- Libya also has invested heavily in Italy: the Libyan Arab Foreign Investment bank owns 13.8 percent of Fiat, worth an estimated \$225 million, and Libya has recently bought the Tamoil Oil Refinery in northern Italy; Libyans own large amounts of real estate in Italy.
- -- Over 15,000 Italians in Libya provide important technical support for Qadhafi's oil industry, harbor construction projects, and military training. Italian firms have done billions of dollars worth of construction work in Libya over the past few years.

Italy has also been a major supplier of arms to Libya in the past but embargoed new military contracts for "dangerous" arms in 1981. In response to the terrorist attacks on the Rome and Vienna airports in December, the Italian Cabinet announced on 9 January "more strict criteria" for selling military supplies to Libya. And on 10 January, Prime Minister Craxi's diplomatic advisor told the US Embassy that this will mean an across-the-board halt to arms deliveries. He also said that Italy would act strongly against firms that sought to undercut the US by providing replacement services; state owned companies will be ordered not to do so, and private companies will be subjected to moral suasion.

25**X**1

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25X1

25**X**1

From the Italian perspective, one of the most important aspects of the bilateral relationship is that Libya has been \$800 million in arrears to Italian companies since early 1982. Italy

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has reluctantly agreed to accept payment in oil, but Tripoli is holding up shipments in an effort to force Rome to buy even more Libyan oil and gas. Nonpayment of this money could cause serious financial problems for several small Italian manufacturing and construction firms, and perhaps for some banks.	25 X 1
Rome's significant economic investment in Libya, the 15,000 Italians living in Libya, and the perception that Italy is highly vulnerable to terrorist attacks will tend to discourage any high profile response to Libyan terrorism. So far, Prime Minister Craxi has insisted that Italy will only endorse sanctions in	
concert with other members of the EC and called for a special meeting of EC ministers to discuss Libya. The five-party coalition government is probably divided on these issues. Foreign Minister Andreotti, who is closely identified with the policy of maintaining close relations with the PLO and business as usual with Qadhafi, is most resistant to	25X1
Craxi is caught in the middle but seems to be leaning more toward Spadolini's position. The Prime Minister will travel to Egypt on 14 January, in part at least, to sound out the Egyptian position on Libya. Egyptian (or any other Arab) support for sanctions would make it much easier for Craxi to further toughen	25X6 25X6
In the meantime, there are a number of signs that the attack on Rome airport has severely shaken the government's Middle East policy. The Cabinet statement on 9 January noted the persistence of grave suspicions about Libyan support for terrorist organizations and the difficulties this creates for bilateral relations, announced further restrictions on military sales to Libya, and declared that economic relations between the two countries were "entirely unsatisfactory"the strongest public	25X1
stand Italy has ever taken against Qadnati.	25X1 25X6
	25 X 1

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						25X1
_	Italy is al requirements for much closer tabs are unlikely, ho Bureau because t their own missio	ready in the pro Libyans, and we on resident Lib wever, to cut ba his would almost n in Tripoli.	ocess of cra e think Rome byans from t ack represent certainly	acking down of a is likely to now on. The ntation in the mean a reduce	on visa to keep Italians ne People's ction in	25X1
						25 X 1
					•	
	•					

<u>Italy</u>

Data Sheet

Exports to Libya

	1981	1985
Value, \$million	4,297	1,293
Percent of total exports	5.71	1.74
Commodity Composition - 1984	Value	Share of Total(%)
		
Total Exports	1,660	2.26
Agriculture Raw Materials Fuels Manufactures Chemicals Semi-Finished Goods Machinery Transport Equipment Consumer Goods	137 26 326 1,171 194 292 221 249 215	2.71 1.73 9.81 1.86 3.08 1.74 1.37 4.03 1.23
Other	0	.02

Imports of Oil from Libya¹

	<u>1981</u>	1985
Gross value, \$ million	3,225	2,700
Net volume, 1,000 b/d	214	256
Net imports as a share of total oil consumption ((%) 11.2	15.1

Workers in Libya

Number: 15,000 Job Categories:

Mostly manufacturing and construction

workers.

Many oil workers. Some miliary technicians.

_				
1	200	note	at.	end.

•			
	Italy		
(Das	ta Sheet cont	inued)	
Arms Deliveries to Libya	1981	<u>1985</u>	~
Value, \$million	190	235	

AGIP operates joint company AGIP N.A.M.E. (North Africa Middle East) on a 50-50 basis with Libyan National Oil Company, operates one oilfield at Bu-Attifl; also owns 19 percent interest in the Bauri offshore Oilfield.

Fiat owns 25 percent interest in a heavy vehicle manufacturing plant at Tajoura.

Calabrese Vehicoli Industriali owns a 25 percent interest in a truck body and trailer manufacturing plant; original 1981 investment was \$6.5 million.

Libyan Investment in Italy

Libyan-Arab Foreign Investment Bank owns 13.8 percent stock of Fiat valued at about \$225 million.

Libya Arab Foreign Investment Bank purchased 70 percent of the Tamoil Oil Refinery in Cremona and 1,000 service stations in November 1985 for a reported \$100 million.

n	November	1985	for	a	reported	\$100	million.	

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<u>Italy</u>	
(Data Sheet co	ntinued)
Reported significant industriation in southern Italy and Sicily.	al and real estate investment
Libyan Debt Owed to Italy	
Since 1982 has owed \$800 milliand medium-sized Italian firms	
Some Italian Companies owed mo	oney are as follows:
Siai Marchetti, Oto Melara Construction, Delmar Machi Monfedi-Alsaldi Constructi CEIB, Itaco, and IPC.	a, Pirelli, CSO-Cogefur ine Co., GECO Electronics Co., ion Co., Montubi Assembly Co.,
Major Companies Operating in Libya	
Company	Activity
AGIP (Subsidiary of ENI)	Oil exploration and development; ENI oversees the purchase of Libyan crude oil.
SNAM (Subsidiary of ENI)	Responsible for purchasing Libyan LNG, presently negotiating the renewal of a long-term LNG contract with Libya.
Snamprogetti (Subsidiary of EN	·
Micoperi-Belleli	Construction and engineering, oilfield equipment; contract to

<u>Italy</u>

(Data Sheet continued)

build two platforms for the second phase of the Ras Lanuf oil refinery

Techimont

Construction and engineering; contract for \$85 million for the Ras Lnuf oil refinery.

Italimpianti

Steel and construction; negotiating contracts for a \$600 million desalinization plant in Tripoli.

Pirelli/CEAT/Telettra/SIRTA

Telephone systems; \$542 million contract in 1979 and \$520 million contract in 1983 for intercity telephone systems in major cities, SIRTE contract in 1985 for telephone link to new military base at Hun.

Montubi

Construction; \$128 million contract for the Wawai West Libyan Pipeline; \$106 million in construction contracts at four Libyan airports; contract to construct a large portable cement unloading barge for Tripoli harbor.

Riva/Mariani

Insulation and accoustical work; contract to work on Ras Lanuf oil refinery.

25X1

	Greece
Feenemia Dal-	
	ations with Libya
apart from the of domestic of trade with Liaccounted onlines, down from September billion dollatexisting econdid sign in Icalled for sa	conomic relations with Libya are relatively modest, he imports of oil which account for about 27 percent consumption. Despite Papandreou's efforts to promote ibya and the Middle East in general, trade with Libya ly for an estimated 1.2 percent of Greek exports in rom 5.2 percent in 1981. Papandreou's visit to Libya 1984 led to the announcement of a highly touted "one ar deal," which was actually just the sum total of nomic agreements over three years. The two countries 1985 a \$500 million military sales agreement, which ales of Greek light arms, ammunition, uniforms, rriers, and anti-tank weapons.
Possible Cond	
ties with the	of its stake in improving political and economic e Arab world, Athens is unlikely to agree to public of Libva or to economic or political sanctions.

Greece

Data Sheet

Exports to Libya

	<u>1981</u>	<u> 1985</u>
Value, \$million	220	53
Percent of total exports	5.17	1.20

Commodity Composition - 1984

	<u>Value</u>	Total(%)
Total Exports	89	1.82
Agriculture Raw Materials Fuels Manufactures Chemicals Semi-Finished Goods Machinery	30 5 0 54 6 30 3	2.03 .94 .04 2.27 2.76 2.35 3.28
Transport Equipment Consumer Goods	0 14	.22 1.91
Other	0	.00

Imports of Oil from Libya¹

	1981	<u>1985</u>
Gross value, \$ million	321	600
Net volume, 1,000 b/d	65	63
Net imports as a share of total oil consumption (%)	27.3	27.0

Workers in Libya

Number: 2,000

Job Categories: Mostly construction workers.

¹ See note at end.

Greece

(Data Sheet continued)

Arms Deliveries to Libya

Value, \$million

1981 1985 0 0

Investment in Libya

No information

Libyan Investment in Greece

Investments by Libya in Greece are mainly in the industrial sector and are implemented through LIBECO, a joint Libya-Greek investment company. Libya owns 60 percent of the firm and the Hellenic Industrial Development Bank (ETBA) owns 40 percent. As of June 1984, the Libyans were involved in 9 projects in Greece, including:

LIRA SA - manufactures children's toys and games.

METALCO SA - produces printed circuits.

GEVI SA - agricultural company involved in canned fruits and vegetables.

KIM SA - produces electric dynamos, water pumps and adaptors.

Asteris Co. - food products.

Panvetti SA - produces metallic and wood office furniture.

Libyan Debt Owed Greece

Unpaid bills - unknown

Arrears - approximately \$40 million

Major Companies Operating in Libya

Company

Metal Construction of Greece (METKA)

Activity

Supply of steel for military projects.

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		Greece				
	(Data Sheet continued)					
	EDOC-ETER	Agricultu	ural services. ~			
	HEL-ARAB	Dock cons	struction.			
				25 X 1		
			•			
	•					
	·					

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	25X1
Turkey	
Economic Relations with Libya	
Turkish economic relations with Libya are significant, but have been declining since 1981. The number of Turkish workers in Libya has dropped from 120,000 in 1982 to approximately 14,000 today. Libya's slowness to pay its debts is the chief factor behind the slump in economic relations—the Libyans owe Turkish firms approximately \$400 million. On the trade side, Turkish exports to Libya peaked in 1981 at \$442 million (9.4 percent of total exports) and have fallen steadily since then, now accounting for just 1.6 percent of total exports. Turkey imports approximately 15 percent of its oil from Libya, with half of these imports tied to paying arrears owed Turkish contractors.	25X1
Turkey has a longstanding military relationship with Libya dating back to 1974.	25X1
Possible Concessions	25 X 1
Ankara is unlikely to take any public actions against Qadhafi, such as a direct condemnation or imposing sanctions. Prime Minister Ozal on 9 January publicly reaffirmed Turkey's ties to Libya, and Turkey has not specifically objected to an Organization of Islamic Countries resolution condemning the US embargo effort as an "imperialist-Zionist threat" aimed at Islamic countries.	25X6 25X6
	25 X 1



Turkey

Data Sheet

Exports to Libya

	<u>1981</u>	<u> 1985</u>
Value, \$million	442	120
Percent of total exports	9.40	1.60

Commodity Composition - 1984

		Share of
	<u>Value</u>	<u>Total</u> (%)
Total Exports	142	1.99
Agriculture	39	1.76
Raw Materials	4	.60
Fuels	0	.02
Manufactures	100	2.56
Chemicals	2	1.01
Semi-Finished Goods	52	2.65
Machinery	5	2.18
Transport Equipment	14	11.06
Consumer Goods	27	1.96
Other	0	1.70

Imports of Oil from Libya 1

	<u>1981</u>	<u>1985</u>
Gross value, \$ million	778	500
Net volume, 1,000 b/d	53	52
Net imports as a share of total oil consumption (%)	17.1	15.0

Workers in Libya

Number: 14,000 Job Categories: Almost all construction workers.

¹ See note at end.

Turkey

(Data Sheet continued)

Arms Deliveries to Libya

1981 1985

Value, \$million

13

0

Investment in Libya

No information

Libyan Investment in Turkey

At least \$28 million

Libyan Debt Owed Turkey

Debt probably amounts to \$3 billion

Arrears equal approximately \$400 million.

Major Companies Operating in Libya

Company	<u>Activity</u>
Aryapi Ltd.	Construction.
B.T.K. AS	Construction.
Baytur Insaat AS	Construction.
Dogus Insaat AS	Construction.
Ece Insaat AS	Construction.
ENKA Insaat AS	Construction.
Goktas AS	Construction.
Libas AS	Construction.
Metis-Mesa AS	Construction.
Mimtas	Construction.

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Note on Oil Import Data

Differences in the behavior of the oil value and volume data between 1981 and 1985 can have several causes. The principal factor is that the volume series gives net figures (imports of crude and products from Libya minus exports of products to Libya) while the value series gives the gross value of imports of Libyan crude and products. In addition, the official price of Libyan oil fell by 24 percent between 1981 and 1985. The decline in actual sales prices may have been even greater and may have varied among importers. Finally, there is a special problem with the value data for Greece in that it excludes oil imports that are paid for with any kind of barter arrangement.

Distribution: Western Europe and Canada: Economic Links with Libya

10Jan86


- 1 Ambassador Ridgway, State
- 1 Ambassador Oakley, State
- 1 Dean Curran, State
- 1 Jerry Kahane, State
- 1 DDI
- 1 NIO/Counterterrorism
- 1 NIO/WE
- 1 D/EURA
- 2 EURA Production
- 4 IMC/CB
- 2 WE Division

DDI/EURA/WE/FO/

	25 X 1
Central Intelligence Agency Office of the Deputy Director for Intelligence	
9 January 1986	
NOTE TO: The Honorable John C. Whitehead Deputy Secretary of State	
- ohn -	
Per your request for data on West European economic dealings with Libya, we have produced the attached typescript, Western Europe: Economic Links with Libya. In addition to the textual discussion of the economic relationship, the paper includes numerous tables detailing	0574
country-by-country dealings with Libya.	25X1
If you have any questions or comments,	25X1
please call Office of European Analysis	25X1
Robert M. Gates	25X1
Deputy Director for Intelligence	
Attachment: As Stated	
	25X1
	20/1







Memorandum for: Mr. Richard A. Clark

Mr. Richard A. Clark
Deputy Assistant Secretary
for Regional Analysis
Bureau of Intelligence and
Research

Per your request
information on West European economic relations with
Libya, we are forwarding the attached typescript,
Western Europe: Economic Links with Libya. We
have also sent a copy of this typescript directly
to John Whitehead. If we can be of any further
assistance, please call me

25X1

25X1

Att:

as stated



9 January 1986

Director, I

EURA

Office of European Analysis
Directorate of Intelligence

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Memorandum for:

Mr. Dean Curran Special Assistant to the Under Secretary for Political Affairs Department of State

Here's the paper I mentioned to you on the phone last night. A copy is also going to Whitehead's office, along with one for Ambassador Ridgway. Let me know anytime if we can help.

· · 25X1

✓ John McLaughlin

Regards,

9 January 1986

EURA

Office of European Analysis Directorate of Intelligence



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Distribution:

1 - The Hon. John C. Whitehead

1 - Amb. Rozanne Ridgway

1 - Dep. Asst. Sec. Clark

1 - Mr. Dean Curran, State

1 - DDI

1 - NIO/Counterterrorism

1 - NIO/WE

1 - D/EURA

2 - EURA/Production

4 - IMC/CB

2 - WE/Division

DDI/EURA/WE/FO/

[9 Jan '86)
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Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D. C. 20505

9 January 1986

Western Europe: Economic Links with Libya

Summary

Western Europe's well-known reluctance to impose sanctions against Libya is only partly due to economic considerations because overall economic relations with Libya are relatively Exports to Libya dropped to an estimated \$3.2 billion last year, less than one-third of the 1981 figure and equal to only 0.4 percent of total exports. Although imports of Libyan oil have fallen less sharply, to about 820,000 b/d last year, they only cover about 7 percent of Western Europe's oil consumption--an insignificant share given the glut in the world oil market. We calculate that even a total cutoff of EC exports to Libya would have only a minimal impact on West European economies. In addition to trade considerations, the West Europeans also fear the loss of perhaps several billion dollars of outstanding loans and unpaid bills owed by West European unwillingness to apply sanctions against Libya probably is driven more by fear of Libyan reprisals -- in Western Europe or against West Europeans working in Libya--as well as by the desire to maintain good relations with other Arab countries. They also continue to believe that sanctions would be ineffective and might set an unwelcome precedent.

		25 X 1
	Office of European	25X1
Analysis. Questions and comments are welcome and may be Chief, West European Division,	<u>e addresse</u> d to	25X1
	EUR M86-20001	25X1
		25X1

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Declining Exports	
The decline in West European exports to Libya during the past few years is almost entirely due to Libya's financial difficulties, rather than any European effort to restrict exports. Italy remains by far the largest exporter, with estimated sales of \$1.3 billion last year41 percent of the West European total; West Germany is a distant second with sales of about \$600 million. Not surprisingly, West European exports to Libya are dominated by manufactured productsmore than two-thirds of the total as of 1984with machinery and semi-finished goods constituting the two largest sub-categories.	25X1
Libya's share of West European exports has dropped from 1.4 percent in 1981 to a minuscule 0.4 percent in 1985. Italy is the country most dependent on the Libyan market, with 1.7 percent of its exports going there last yearbut this share is down from 5.7 percent in 1981. Only two other West European countries sent more than 1 percent of their exports to Libya last year: Turkey, with about 1.6 percent (down from 9.4 percent in 1981) and Greece with an estimated 1.2 percent (down from 5.2 percent in 1981).]
Oil Dependency	25 X 1
Over the last decade or so Libyan oil has typically covered about 7 percent of Western Europe's total oil consumption. Net oil import volume has fallen somewhat from about 910,000 b/d in 1983 to about 820,000 during first-half 1985. Since 1983 Italy has been the largest single West European importer of Libyan oil, followed closely by West Germany; prior to 1983 the positions of the two countries were reversed. Italy and West Germany together account for more than half of Western Europe's oil imports from Libya.	25 X 1
Greece is most dependent on Libyan oil, which covered 27 percent of Greece's total oil consumption in first-half 1985. Following Greece were Turkey and Italy (15 percent each), Switzerland (11 percent) and Austria and West Germany (9 percent each). West European vulnerability to a Libyan oil embargo is presumably less than these figures suggest, however, because of the world oil gluttotal West European imports of Libyan oil are small in relation to the spare production capacity in other OPEC	ZOXI
countries.	25 X 1

Arms Sales

Libya, which gets almost three-quarters of its military assistance from the Soviet Bloc, is a relatively small and declining arms market for Western Europe. After averaging \$588 million annually during 1980-1982, West European arms deliveries

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to Libya fell to \$388 million in 1983 and \$228 million in 1984. Moreover, only \$107 million in new arms agreements were signed during 1983-1984, almost all of this coming in a single deal with Italy. With French deliveries falling off sharply. Italy became the largest West European arms supplier in 1984.

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In 1985, the value of West European arms sales agreements with Libya rose considerably, primarily because of a \$500 million Greek arrangement which calls for future deliveries of ammunition, small arms, and various military equipment, including personnel carriers and anti-tank weapons. In addition, Italy signed a \$422 million deal, mainly for the delivery of unassembled trucks, while France signed \$250 million worth of contracts for the provision of spare parts, a naval simulator, and a facility to produce tools and spare parts. We do not believe this increase in agreements, however, will result in an appreciable jump in annual military deliveries to Libya, in part because the deliveries will be spread out over several years. Furthermore, while the French and Italian deals seem fairly solid, the Greek deal is only an agreement in principle and Athens is cautious about going ahead for fear that the United States would respond by curtailing arms sales to Greece, including F-16s. Moreover, all major West European countries have curbed sales of lethal weapons to Libya in light of Libya's occupation of Chad and the terrorist incident at the Libyan Embassy in London.

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Workers in Libya

Information on the number of West European workers in Libya is fragmentary but the total appears to be about 60,000 to 70,000. Turkey clearly heads the list with about 35,000 workers, followed by Italy (16,000) and the United Kingdom (5,000). The Turks are mainly construction workers involved in a variety of projects contracted for by Tripoli. Their numbers have fallen sharply over the last several years and their difficulties in remitting their earnings to Turkey have been a source of great concern to Ankara. Many of the workers from other West European countries are technicians who play a key role in Libya's oil industry.

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Investment and Debt

Western Europe appears to be concentrated in Italy. Libya's investments in industrial and commercial firms are mainly held by the Libyan-Arab Foreign Investment Bank. According to press reports, the Bank is worth \$6 billion and has investments in 94 companies, 27 of which are in Western Europe. It now owns 14.5

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percent of Fiat's stock--worth about \$145 million--but the Agnelli family maintains controlling interest in the company. Last November the Bank purchased a 70-percent interest in Italy's 100,000 b/d Tamoil oil refinery, including about 1,000 service stations. Libya has banking interests in a number of West European countries, including West Germany, France, Italy, and Spain.

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West European investment in Libya is concentrated in the oil industry. Three West German oil firms--VEBA, Wintershall, and Deminix--operate in Libya, two with Libyan partners. West German investment in Libya totaled \$107 million in 1983. Italy's national energy corporation, ENI, has substantial investments in Libya, and AGIP, an ENI subsidiary, is a large oil producing company in the country. The French firm Elf also is engaged in oil exploration and production in Libya. Austria's state oil company, OMV, agreed last June to acquire 12.5 percent of Libya's largest crude producer. The United Kingdom has not had significant investments in Libya since British Petroleum pulled out in 1969.

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Libya may have as much as several billion dollars worth of debts and unpaid bills outstanding to Western Europe, with Italy probably being the largest creditor. The arrearages reportedly total about \$800 million for Italy, \$400 million for Turkey, \$125 million for France, \$80 million for Spain, and \$40 million for Greece. In January 1985, Italy began taking 40,000 b/d of oil as payment but Libya halted the oil shipments in August when Rome refused to renew a long-term LNG contract. Mainly as a result of these payments problems, West Germany and Italy have curtailed export guarantees for goods going to Libya and Italy has also cut off suppliers' credits to Libya.

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Impact on Western Europe of Imposing Sanctions on Libya

Imposing economic sanctions on Libya would have little impact on economic growth in Western Europe, although it might put at risk the West Europeans' investments in Libya as well as their financial claims against Tripoli. Using our Linked Policy Impact Model we analyzed a rather extreme case—a total embargo on EC exports to Libya—and found that real GDP growth in the Community would be lowered by only 0.2 percentage point in the first year and 0.1 point in the second year; the impact on the unemployment rate for the region as a whole would be insignificant. The Italian economy would be hardest hit with a first-year GDP loss of 0.5 percentage point and a 0.1 percentage point rise in unemployment.

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While Western Europe's overall economic loss from sanctions would be small, specific firms and regions could suffer

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substantially. Exporters to Libya--led by Fiat--probably would be the biggest losers. A cutoff of Libyan payments would also cause serious financial problems for several small Italian manufacturing and

construction firms, and perhaps for some banks as well. And of course the oil companies operating in Libya could be hurt by a Libyan seizure of their assets there. All of these affected groups, along with West European arms producers, undoubtedly

would lobby hard for a quick end to the sanctions.

Implications

We believe the West Europeans' reluctance to impose sanctions is not primarily driven by their economic ties to Libya. In our view, it is more a reflection of West European governments' concern about possible reprisals against their citizens in Libya and about increased Libyan-sponsored terrorism Given Libya's support within the Arab League, the West at home. Given Libya's support within the Arab League, the West Europeans may also fear that sanctions would endanger their more extensive economic relations with other Arab countries. Finally, the West Europeans remain convinced that economic sanctions rarely are effective and are concerned that imposing sanctions in this case might set an unwelcome precedent for the future.

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Table 1
Western Europe: Value of Exports To Libya, 1976-1985

(million US dollars) 1985¹ Western Europe European Community 2 2503 Belgium/Luxembourg Denmark France Ireland Italy Nether lands United Kingdom Germany Greece Other West European Countries Austria Finland Norway Portuga 1 Spain Sweden Switzerland Turkey

Estimate

²Excluding Spain and Portugal

Table 2 Western Europe: Share of Exports To Libya, 1976-1985

			(percent				ercent of	total ex	(ports)	
	<u>1976</u>	<u>1977</u>	<u>1978</u>	<u>1979</u>	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	<u>198</u> 5
Western Europe	0.73	0.74	0.70	0.76	0.83	1.36	0.77	0.71	0.57	0.44
European Community	² 0.76	0.80	0.75	0.83	0.89	1.43	0.80	0.74	0.59	0.46
Belgium/Luxembourg Denmark France Ireland Italy Netherlands United Kingdom Germany Greece	0.43 0.20 0.61 0.63 2.68 0.21 0.53 0.51 5.07	0.61 0.19 0.61 0.73 2.70 0.21 0.54 0.55 4.54	0.30 0.15 0.67 0.60 2.33 0.18 0.61 0.58 3.38	0.23 0.14 0.65 1.17 2.67 0.19 0.61 0.68 4.29	0.43 0.18 0.58 1.62 3.28 0.22 0.61 0.65 3.25	0.69 0.34 0.85 1.30 5.71 0.39 1.04 0.84 5.17	0.21 0.22 0.44 0.70 2.91 0.29 0.47 0.66 2.62	0.16 0.32 0.35 0.71 2.89 0.38 0.45 0.50 2.30	0.20 0.17 0.22 0.43 2.26 0.28 0.35 0.47 1.86	0.14 0.10 0.23 0.34 1.74 0.22 0.29 0.34 1.20
Other West European Countries	0.59	0.45	0.43	0.41	0.55	1.03	0.67	0.61	0.51	0.35
Austria Finland Norway Portugal Spain Sweden Switzerland Turkey	0.50 0.30 0.05 0.33 1.48 0.63 0.53 0.50	0.53 0.13 0.06 0.31 1.57 0.12 0.45 0.77	0.51 0.13 0.08 0.02 0.96 0.21 0.44 2.17	0.59 0.35 0.07 0.10 0.95 0.25 0.21	0.70 0.38 0.05 0.11 1.73 0.25 0.29 2.07	0.94 0.46 0.04 0.11 2.10 0.62 0.37 9.40	0.78 0.37 0.05 0.05 1.30 0.35 0.33 4.07	0.70 0.24 0.04 0.04 1.40 0.28 0.39	0.61 0.20 0.02 0.03 1.13 0.24 0.39 1.99	0.43 0.14 0.02 0.01 0.67 0.19 0.29 1.60

¹Estimate ²Excluding Spain and Portugal

Table 3 Western Europe: Net Imports of Libyan Oil by Volume, 1976-1985¹

(1,000 b/d)

	<u>1976</u>	<u>1977</u>	1978	<u>1979</u>	1980	<u>1981</u>	1982	1983	1984	1985 ²
Western Europe	1110	982	936	997	896	733	907	912	830	818
European Community	3 943	815	756	819	687	557	692	705	636	661
Belgium/Luxembourg Denmark France West Germany Greece Ireland Italy Netherlands United Kingdom	0 1 63 423 38 0 343 19 55	0 1 57 395 9 0 280 23 49	3 0 68 307 5 0 304 39 30	10 0 83 358 24 0 306 24 15	5 0 41 312 56 0 252 19 3	2 0 33 216 65 0 214 18 9	61 0 51 226 50 0 219 38 46	47 1 63 212 52 0 218 82 30	31 0 74 195 49 0 227 38 23	3 0 48 204 63 0 248 47 49
Other West European Countries	168	168	180	178	209	176	215	207	194	157
Austria Finland Norway Portugal Spain Sweden Switzerland Turkey	20 0 11 3 103 10 7	15 0 7 0 116 8 7 15	18 0 8 0 114 8 20 12	19 0 4 0 111 13 20 11	22 0 1 0 97 19 22 48	15 0 1 0 92 3 12 53	23 0 0 2 80 23 19 68	13 0 0 3 79 16 35 61	20 0 0 0 79 0 40 54	18 0 0 0 59 1 27 52

 $^{^1}_{\mbox{2Estimate}}$ Imports from Libya of crude and products minus exports to Libya of products. $^2_{\mbox{Extimate}}$ Excluding Spain and Portugal

Table 4 Western Europe: Net imports of Libyan oil as a share of total oil consumption, 1976-1985

								(percei	nt)	
	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	<u>1981</u>	1982	1983	1984	<u>1985</u> 1
Western Europe	8.0	7.2	6.7	7.0	6.7	5.9	7.7	8.0	7.2	7.2
European Communi	ty ² 8.6	7.6	6.8	7.2	6.6	5.8	7.7	8.0	7.1	7.6
Pelgium/Luxembou Denmark France West Germany Greece Ireland Italy Netherlands United Kingdom		0 0.4 2.5 14.4 4.2 0 14.6 3.0 2.7	0.6 0 2.9 10.8 2.0 0 15.2 5.0 1.6	1.7 0 3.5 12.2 9.7 0 14.8 2.9 0.8	0.9 0.1 1.9 11.9 22.5 0 12.9 2.4 0.2	0.5 0 1.6 9.2 27.3 0 11.2 2.6 0.6	13.0 0 2.8 10.1 21.1 0 12.1 6.2 3.1	11.2 0.6 3.5 9.6 22.7 0 12.2 14.1 2.1	7.5 0 4.3 8.8 20.8 0 13.4 6.6 1.3	0.6 0 2.8 9.2 27.0 0 14.6 8.2 3.0
Other West European Countri		5.9	6.3	6.0	7.1	6.3	7.9	7.8	7.6	6.1
Austria Finland Norway Portugal Spain Sweden Switzerland Turkey	8.5 0 6.4 1.9 10.7 1.8 2.8 4.2	6.7 0 3.7 0 12.8 1.5 2.6 4.5	7.6 0 4.5 0.2 12.3 1.4 7.4 3.8	7.7 0 1.9 0.2 11.3 2.3 7.6 3.9	8.8 0 0.6 0.2 9.3 3.8 8.6 16.2	7.0 0 0.9 0 9.1 0.8 5.0	10.9 0 0.2 1.0 8.4 5.3 8.6 20.6	6.4 0 0 1.4 8.3 4.4 14.3	10.1 0 0.2 9.0 0 16.8 15.8	9.1 0 0.1 0.1 6.7 0.4 11.4 15.0

¹Estimate ²Excluding Spain and Portugal

Table 5
Western Europe: Military Assistance To Libya*, 1980-1984

A = AGREEMENTS

D = DELIVERIES

(million US dollars)

	<u>1980</u>		1981		<u>1982</u>		1983		<u>1984</u>		1985	
	Α	D	Α	D	Α	D	Α	D	Α	D	Α	D
TOTAL	365	668	106	544	193	553	1	388	106	228	1172	243
Austria			NEGL	NEGL								
Belgium	277	93		216		NEGL						
Finland		5		5		5						
France	56	104		97		395		180		60	250	
Germany	1	302	72	15	5	37			. 8	20		8
Greece									NA		500	
Italy	NEGL	110	3	190	183	108	NEGL	176	97	147	422	235
Netherlands	18	18	30	8				30				
Spain	NEGL	NEGL		NA			1	1	1	1		
Sweden												
Switzerland					1			1				
Turkey	5	3		13		3	NA	NEGL				
United Kingdom	8	33	1		4	5	~					

*	D	T	Α	E	ς	t.	i	m	a	t.	e	S

Table 6

Western Europe: Workers Currently in Libya

Turkey	35,000
Italy	16,000
United Kingdom	5,000
Greece	2,000
Portugal	1,700
Germany	1,500
France	1,200
Ireland	1,000
Netherlands	450
Austria	200

Table 7

Western Europe: Selected Companies Dealing with Libya

Manufacturing and Service Companies

West Germany

BASF
Brown Boveri & Compagnie
Buckau-Walther AG.
Detecon
Kloeckner-Humboldt-Deutz
Kutluat
Liquid Gas Anlagen
Siemens
Thyssen Engineering
VEBA

France

Air France
BBC Brown
Bouygues
EMH
Societe Internationale de Dessalement
Societe Nationale Elf Aquitaine (Elf)
Sofrerail
Spie Batignolles
USINOR

United Kingdom

Barkley Bank
Brown & Root
Brush Transformers
Cubitt & Partners
Imperial Chemical Industries (ICI)
John Brown Offshore
Motherwell Bridge
Tilden Industries
Transmark
Weir Group

Manufacturing and Service Companies (continued)

<u>Italy</u>

AGIP North Africa & Middle East (Subsidiary of ENI)
Belleli
Fasano
Fiat
Micoperi
SNAM (Societa Nazionale Metandotti) (Subsidiary of ENI)
Snamprogetti (Subsidiary of ENI)
Technimont
Transmediterranea di Navigazione

<u>Spain</u>

Construcciones Internacionales Ferrovial Foster Wheeler Iberia Huarte Page Iberia, S.A.

Netherlands

Royal Boscalis Westminster

Switzerland

Geos Ingenieur-Conseil Marc Rich Co. AG Sulzer Escher Wyss Unibuild

Belgium

Ateliers de Constructions Electriques de Charleroi Belgonucleaire Cockerill Electrobel Electrobel Engineering International Fabricom Tractionel

Austria

Voest-Alpine

Norway

Aircontact

Manufacturing and Service Companies (continued)

Turkey

Dogus Construction ENKA Temel Investigation

Luxembourg

TRATCO

Defense Industries

France

Aerospatiale
Construction Mecaniques de Normandie
Dassault
Electronique Marcel Dassault
Engins Matra
Matra SA
Thomson-CSF
TRT

United Kingdom

Alvis British Aerospace Dynamic Group Daimler Company

Italy

Augusta Bell Fiat Oto Melara Spa Siai-Machetti

Financial Institutions

West Germany

Commerzbank Deutsche Bank Dresdner Bank

France

Banque de Paris

Financial Institutions (continued)

United Kingdom

Barclay's Bank Lloyds

Italy

Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Banca di Roma

Netherlands

Algemene Bank

Austria

Austrian Central Bank Creditanstalt Bankverein

Norway

Christiana Bank

<u>Turkey</u>

Akbank Garanti Bankasi Is Bankasi Pamukbank Ticaret Bankasi Uluslararasi Bankasi Vakiflar Bankasi Yapi ve Kredi Bankasi

Greece

Bank of Greece

Malta

Central Bank of Malta

Memorandum for: DDT

Bob:

Here is the revised package we prepared for Deputy Secretary Whitehead Friday. The main changes were to factor Ottawa into the overview paper and to add 9 separate country annexes keyed to his stops. The latter task involved more original work, mainly by our WE Division, than I anticipated when we spoke Friday morning.

We are handcarrying the package Saturday morning to Whitehead's office, along with separate copies for Mike Armacost and Ambassador Ridgway (both received the original paper) and Ambassador Oakley, who tasked us separately for the same material. A copy also

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John E. McLaughlin Deputy Director

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10 Jan 86

EURA

Office of European Analysis
Directorate of Intelligence





Central Intelligence Agency



10 January 1986

Western Europe and Canada: Economic Links with Libya

Summary

Western Europe's well-known reluctance to impose sanctions against Libya is only partly due to economic considerations because overall economic relations with Libya are relatively small; this applies even more so to Canada. European exports to Libya dropped to an estimated \$3.2 billion last year, less than one-third of the 1981 figure and equal to only 0.4 percent of total exports. Although imports of Libyan oil have fallen less sharply, to about 840,000 b/d last year, they only cover about 7 percent of Western Europe's oil consumption--an insignificant share given the glut in the world oil market. We calculate that even a total cutoff of EC exports to Libya would have only a minimal impact on West European economies. As for Canada, Libya in 1985 took less than 0.1 percent of Canadian exports and accounted for less than 1 percent of Canadian oil consumption. In addition to trade considerations, the West Europeans also fear the loss of perhaps several billion dollars of outstanding loans and unpaid bills owed by Libya. The Allies' unwillingness to apply sanctions against Libya probably is driven more by fear of Libyan reprisals--at home or against their citizens in Libya--as well as by the desire to maintain good relations with other Arab countries. They also continue to believe that sanctions would be ineffective and might set an unwelcome precedent.

This memorandum was prepared by

25X1 Office of European Analysis. Questions and comments are welcome and may be addressed to 25X1 25X1 EUR M86-20001

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Chief, West European Division.

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Declining Exports

The decline in West European and Canadian exports to Libya during the past few years is almost entirely due to Libya's financial difficulties, rather than any effort to restrict exports. Italy remains by far the largest exporter, with estimated sales of \$1.3 billion last year--41 percent of the West European total; West Germany is a distant second with sales of about \$600 million. Not surprisingly, exports to Libya are dominated by manufactured products--more than two-thirds of the total as of 1984--with machinery and semi-finished goods constituting the two largest sub-categories.

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Libya's share of West European exports has dropped from 1.4 percent in 1981 to 0.4 percent in 1985; for Canada it has never exceeded 0.1 percent. Italy is the country most dependent on the Libyan market, with 1.7 percent of its exports going there last year--but this share is down from 5.7 percent in 1981. Only two other West European countries sent more than 1 percent of their exports to Libya last year: Turkey, with about 1.6 percent (down from 9.4 percent in 1981) and Greece with an estimated 1.2 percent (down from 5.2 percent in 1981).

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<u>Oil Dependency</u>

Over the last decade or so Libyan oil has typically covered about 7 percent of Western Europe's total oil consumption and less than 1 percent of Canada's--and in any event, Canada is a net oil exporter. Net West European oil import volume from Libya has fallen somewhat from about 910,000 b/d in 1983 to about 840,000 during January-September 1985. Since 1983 Italy has been the largest single West European importer of Libyan oil, followed closely by West Germany; prior to 1983 the positions of the two countries were reversed. Italy and West Germany together account for more than half of Western Europe's oil imports from Libya.

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Greece is most dependent on Libyan oil, which covered 27 percent of Greece's total oil consumption during January-September 1985. Following Greece were Turkey and Italy (15 percent each), Switzerland (11 percent) and Austria and West Germany (9 percent each). West European vulnerability to a Libyan oil embargo is presumably less than these figures suggest, however, because of the world oil glut--total West European imports of Libyan oil are small in relation to the spare production capacity in other OPEC countries.

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Arms Sales

Libya, which gets almost three-quarters of its military assistance from the Soviet Bloc, is a relatively small and declining arms market for Western Europe, and a tiny market for Canada. After averaging \$588 million annually during 1980-1982, West European arms deliveries to Libya fell to \$388 million in 1983 and \$288 million in 1984. Moreover, only \$314 million in new arms agreements were signed during 1983-1984, almost all of this coming in a single deal with Italy. With French deliveries falling off sharply, Italy became the largest West European arms supplier in 1984. Canadian arms deliveries totaled only \$12 million during 1980-1984 and no new agreements were signed during this period.

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In 1985, the value of West European arms sales agreements with Libya rose considerably, primarily because of a \$500 million Greek arrangement which calls for future deliveries of ammunition, small arms, and various military equipment, including personnel carriers and anti-tank weapons. In addition, Italy signed a \$422 million deal, mainly for the delivery of unassembled trucks, while France signed \$250 million worth of contracts for the provision of spare parts, a naval simulator, and a facility to produce tools and spare parts. We do not believe this increase in agreements, however, will result in an appreciable jump in annual military deliveries to Libya, in part because the deliveries will be spread out over several years. Furthermore, while the French and Italian deals seem fairly solid, the Greek deal is only an agreement in principle and Athens is cautious about going ahead for fear that the United States would respond by curtailing arms sales to Greece, including F-16s. Moreover, all major West European countries have curbed sales of lethal weapons to Libya in light of Libya's occupation of Chad and the terrorist incident at the Libyan Embassy in London.

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Workers in Libya

Information on West European and Canadian workers in Libya is fragmentary but the total number clearly has fallen sharply over the last few years and probably is below 50,000. Turkey alone had about 120,000 workers in Libya in 1981, almost all of them involved in a wide variety of construction projects undertaken by Turkish firms. By December 1985 the number had plunged to about 14,000, according to the Turkish press, mainly because of Libya's financial difficulties. Italy probably heads the list now with about 15,000 workers, followed by Turkey and the United Kingdom (5,000). Many of the workers from West European countries and Canada are technicians who play a key role in Libya's oil industry.

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Investment and D	n h +	
<u>Investment</u> and D	= 	
	Libyan investment in	25
Western Europe a	opears to be concentrated in Italy, lihva's	
the libyan Amah	ndustrial and commercial firms are mainly held by	
reports, the Ban	Foreign Investment Bank. According to press (is worth \$6 billion and has investments in 94	
companies, 2/ of	Which are in Western Furope. It now owns 13.8	
percent of Fiat'	s stockworth about \$225 millionbut the	
Agnelli family m	aintains controlling interest in the company.	
100 000 b/d Tamo	Bank purchased a 70-percent interest in Italy's il oil refinery, including about 1,000 service	
stations. Libva	has banking interests in a number of West	
Europea <u>n countri</u>	es. including West Germany, France, Italy, and	
Spain.		2
Wast Funance	nn invoctment in libra is samest to the contract	
industry. Three	nn investment in Libya is concentrated in the oil West German oil firmsVEBA, Wintershall, and	
Deminixoperate	in Libya, two with Libyan partners. West German	
investment in Lil	va totaled \$107 million in 1983 - Italvic	
national energy (Corporation. ENI. has substantial investments in	
Libya, and AGIP,	an ENI subsidiary, is a large oil producing	
agreed last June	ountry. Austria's state oil company, OMV, to acquire 12.5 percent of Libya's largest crude	
producer. Embas:	y Paris reports that French investment in Lihva	
is minuscule with	many firms having pulled out since 1981. The	
British Potrolour	s not had significant investments in Libya since pulled out in 1969.	
Di itisii retroreur	puried out in 1909.	25
Libya may ha	ve as much as several billion dollars worth of	
debts and unpaid	bills outstanding to Western Europe, with Italy largest creditor. The arrearages reportedly	
probably being the	le largest creditor. The arrearages reportedly	
million for Spair	million for Italy, \$400 million for Turkey, \$80, \$55 million for France, and \$40 million for	
Greece. In Janua	ry 1985, Italy began taking 40.000 b/d of oil as	
payment but Libya	. halted the oil shipments in August when Rome	
retused to renew	a long-term LNG contract. Mainly as a result of	
export quarantees	oblems, West Germany and Italy have curtailed for goods going to Libya and Italy has also cut	
off suppliers' cr	edits to Libya.	25
Tunnach U (
Impact on Westerr	Europe of Imposing Sanctions on Libya	
Imposina eco	nomic sanctions on Libya would have little	
impact on economi	C growth in Western Europe, although it might	
put at risk the w	est Europeans' investments in Libva as well as	
Impact Model we a	laims against Tripoli. Using our Linked Policy nalyzed a rather extreme casea total embargo	
on EC exports to	Libyaand found that real GDP growth in the	
. , , , , , , ,	James James James James Growth In the	
	A	
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Community would be lowered by only 0.2 percentage point in the first year and 0.1 point in the second year; the impact on the unemployment rate for the region as a whole would be insignificant. The Italian economy would be hardest hit with a first-year GDP loss of 0.5 percentage point and a 0.1 percentage point rise in unemployment. 25X1 While Western Europe's overall economic loss from sanctions would be small, specific firms and regions could suffer substantially. Exporters to Libya--led by Fiat--probably would 25X1 be the biggest losers. 25X1 A cutoff of Libyan payments would also cause serious financial problems for several small Italian manufacturing and 25X1 construction firms, and perhaps for some banks as well. And of course the oil companies operating in Libya could be hurt by a Libyan seizure of their assets there. All of these affected 25X1 groups, along with West European arms producers, undoubtedly would lobby hard against the imposition of sanctions.

<u>Implications</u>

We believe West European and Canadian reluctance to impose sanctions is not primarily driven by their economic ties to Libya. In our view, it is more a reflection of concern about possible reprisals against their citizens in Libya and about increased Libyan-sponsored terrorism at home. Given Libya's support within the Arab League, they may also fear that sanctions would endanger their more extensive economic relations with other Arab countries.

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The West Europeans also remain convinced that economic sanctions rarely are effective and should be used only in the most extraordinary circumstances. Both Fabius and Thatcher recently have said that 100 percent effectiveness is necessary for success and dismiss such a prospect as unrealistic. In the past, the West Europeans have been reluctant to join US initiated economic embargos, although they grudgingly sided with Thatcher in 1982 over the Falklands (principally in the name of "EC solidarity"). Most recently, though agreeing to some sanctions on trade with South Africa, they have shied away from other than largely symbolic or future constraints. That said, were a major West European power to call for sanctions (as France did with regard to South Africa), the EC would seek some accommodation of the request. Unless the West Europeans become more open to sanctions, we see no reason to expect that EC foreign ministers, when they meet on 27 January or perhaps earlier, will agree to implement broad economic measures against Libya.

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Table 1 Western Europe and Canada: Value of Exports To Libya, 1976-1985

(million US dollars)

								•		•
	<u>1976</u>	<u>1977</u>	<u>1978</u>	<u>1979</u>	1980	<u>1981</u>	1982	1983	1984	<u> 1985</u> 1
Canada	11	18	18	32	61	93	96	62	60	56
Western Europe	2909	3424	3870	5287	6689	10151	5567	5019	4158	3180
European Community	² 2503	3075	3463	4804	5918	8781	4704	4238	3450	2690
Belgium/Luxembourg Denmark France Ireland Italy Netherlands United Kingdom Germany Greece Other West European Countries	142 18 350 21 997 82 242 522 130	231 19 398 32 1225 92 303 650 125	135 17 533 34 1304 90 412 822 114	130 21 650 84 1926 122 528 1177 166	279 31 671 138 2545 166 670 1251 168	383 55 907 100 4297 267 1067 1486 220	108 33 428 57 2141 192 460 1173 113	81 51 334 61 2104 246 417 841 102	104 27 212 41 1660 185 328 804 89	68 16 220 33 1293 143 281 583 53
Austria Finland Norway Portugal Spain Sweden Switzerland Turkey	43 19 4 6 129 117 78 10	51 10 5 6 160 23 80 14	62 11 8 1 125 47 104 50	91 39 9 4 174 69 54 43	122 54 10 5 358 76 86 60	149 65 7 5 427 177 99 442	121 49 9 2 267 94 86 235	107 30 7 2 276 76 99 184	97 28 3 2 267 71 100 142	68 17 3 3 151 55 73 120

¹Estimate ²Excluding Spain and Portugal

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Table 2
Western Europe and Canada: Share of Exports To Libya, 1976-1985

(percent of total exports) <u>19</u>85¹ 1976 1979 1982 1977 1978 1980 1981 1983 1984 Canada 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.09 0.13 0.13 0.08 0.06 0.07 Western Europe 0.73 0.74 0.70 0.76 0.83 1.36 0.77 0.71 0.57 0.44 European Community 2 0.76 0.80 0.75 0.83 0.89 0.80 0.46 1.43 0.74 0.59 0.61 0.30 0.23 0.43 0.69 0.21 0.20 0.14 Belgium/Luxembourg 0.43 0.16 0.20 0.19 0.15 0.14 0.18 0.34 Denmark 0.22 0.32 0.17 0.10 0.67 France 0.61 0.61 0.65 0.58 0.85 0.44 0.35 0.22 0.23 Ireland 0.63 0.73 0.60 1.17 1.62 1.30 0.70 0.71 0.43 0.34 Italy 2.68 2.70 2.33 2.67 3.28 5.71 2.91 2.89 2,26 1.74 **Netherlands** 0.21 0.21 0.18 0.19 0.22 0.29 0.22 0.39 0.38 0.28 0.29 United Kingdom 0.53 0.54 0.61 0.61 0.61 1.04 0.47 0.45 0.35 Germany 0.51 0.55 0.58 0.68 0.65 0.84 0.66 0.50 0.47 0.34 1.20 5.07 4.29 3.25 2.62 2.30 1.86 Greece 4.54 3.38 5.17 Other West European Countries 0.59 0.45 0.43 0.41 0.35 0.55 1.03 0.67 0.61 0.51 Austria 0.50 0.53 0.51 0.59 0.70 0.94 0.78 0.70 0.61 0.43 Finland 0.30 0.13 0.13 0.35 0.38 0.46 0.37 0.24 0.20 0.14 0.05 0.06 0.02 0.02 0.08 0.07 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.04 Norway 0.33 0.10 0.04 0.03 0.01 Portuga 1 0.31 0.02 0.11 0.11 0.05 1.13 0.67 1.48 1.57 0.96 0.95 1.30 1.40 Spain 1.73 2.10 Sweden 0.63 0.12 0.21 0.25 0.25 0.62 0.35 0.28 0.24 0.19 0.29 0.29 0.53 0.45 0.44 0.21 0.37 0.33 0.39 0.39 Switzerland Turkey 0.50 0.77 2.17 1.91 2.07 9.40 4.07 3.22 1.99 1.60

1 Estimate 2 Excluding Spain and Portugal

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(1,000 b/d)

	<u>1976</u>	<u>1977</u>	<u>1978</u>	<u>1979</u>	1980	<u>1981</u>	<u>1982</u>	<u>1983</u>	<u>1984</u>	<u>1985</u> ²
Canada	20	0	5	7	5	7	1	5	5	5
Western Europe	1110	982	936	997	896	733	907	912	830	844
European Community	943	815	756	819	687	557	692	705	636	687
Belgium/Luxembourg	0	0	3	10	5	2	61	47	31	2
Denmark	63	1 57	0 68	0 83	0 41	0 33	0 51	63	0 74	0 63
France West Germany	423	395	307	358	312	216	226	212	195	203
Greece	38	9	5	24	56	65	50	52	49	63
Ireland	0	ő	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Italy	343	280	304	306	252	214	219	218	227	256
Netherlands	19	23	39	24	19	18	38	82	38	49
United Kingdom	55	49	30	15	3	-9	46	30	23	51
Other West										
European Countries	168	168	180	178	209	176	215	207	194	157
Austria	20	15	18	19	22	15	23	13	20	18
Finland	Ō	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Norway	11	7	8	4	1	1	0	0	0	0
Portugal	3	0	0	0	0	0	2	3	0	Õ
Spain	103	116	114	111	97	92	80	79	79	59
Sweden	10	8	8	13	19	3	23	16	0	1
Switzerland	7	7	20	20	22	12	19	35	40	27
Turkey	13	15	12	11	48	53	68	61	54	52

 $[\]frac{1}{2} \text{Imports}$ from Libya of crude and products minus exports to Libya of products. $\frac{2}{2} \text{Estimate}$

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³Excluding Spain and Portugal

Table 4
Western Europe and Canada: Net imports of Libyan oil as a share of total oil consumption, 1976-1985

(percent) 1985¹ 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1.1 Canada 0 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.1 0.4 0.4 0.4 Western Europe 8.0 7.2 6.7 7.0 6.7 5.9 7.7 8.0 7.2 7.4 European Community²8.6 7.6 6.8 7.2 6.6 5.8 7.7 8.0 7.9 7.1 0 0.6 1.7 0.9 0.5 13.0 11.2 7.5 0.6 Belgium/Luxembourg Denmark 0.3 0.4 0 0.1 0 0 0 0.6 0 0 3.7 4.3 2.6 2.5 2.9 3.5 1.9 1.6 2.8 3.5 France West Germany 15.2 14.4 10.8 12.2 11.9 9.2 10.1 9.6 8.8 9.2 18.0 9.7 4.2 27.0 Greece 2.0 22.5 27.3 21.1 22.7 20.8 Ireland 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 14.6 17.4 15.2 14.8 12.9 11.2 Italy 12.1 12.2 13.4 15.1 2.4 Nether lands 3.0 2.9 5.0 2.4 2.6 6.2 14.1 6.6 8.5 3.0 2.7 United Kingdom 1.6 0.8 0.2 0.6 3.1 2.1 1.3 3.0 Other West European Countries 5.7 5.9 6.3 6.0 7.1 6.3 7.9 7.8 7.6 6.1 8.5 6.7 7.6 7.7 8.8 9.1 Austria 7.0 10.9 6.4 10.1 Finland 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6.4 3.7 4.5 1.9 0.6 0.9 0.2 0 0.1 Norway 0 Portuga 1 1.9 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0 0 1.0 1.4 0.1 Spain 10.7 12.8 12.3 11.3 9.3 9.1 8.4 8.3 9.0 6.7 Sweden 1.8 1.5 1.4 2.3 3.8 8.0 5.3 4.4 0.4 0 **Switzerland** 2.8 2.6 7.4 7.6 14.3 16.8 11.4 8.6 5.0 8.6 Turkey 4.2 4.5 3.8 3.9 16.2 17.1 20.6 18.8 15.8 15.0

¹Estimate

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²Excluding Spain and Portugal

Table 5
Western Europe and Canada: Military Assistance To Libya*, 1980-1984

A = AGREEMENTS

D = DELIVERIES

(million US dollars)

	198	<u>30</u>	19	<u>81</u>	19	<u> 182</u>	19	83	<u>19</u>	84	<u>19</u>	85
	Α	D	Α	D	Α	D	Α	D	Α	D	A	D
Canada		5		5				2				
Western Europe	365	668	106	544	193	553	1	388	106	228	1172	243
Austria			NEGL	NEGL								
Belgium	277	93		216		NEGL						
Finland		5		5		5						
France	56	104		97		395		180		60	250	
Germany	1	302	72	15	5	37			8	20		8
Greece									NA		500	
Italy	NEGL	110	3	190	183	108	NEGL	176	97	147	422	235
Netherlands	18	18	30	8				30				
Spain	NEGL	NEGL		NĂ			1	ĭ	1	1		
Sweden												
Switzerland					1			1				
Turkey	5	3		13		3	NA	NEGL				_
United Kingdom	8	33	1		4	5	147	HEUL		-		

*DIA Estimates

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Table 6

Western Europe and Canada: Workers Currently in Libya

Canada		1,300
Western	Europe	42,000
	Italy	15,000
	Turkey	14,000
	United Kingdom	5,000
	Greece	2,000
	Portugal	1,700
	Germany	1,500
	France	1,200
	Ireland	1,000
	Netherlands	400
	Austria	200
	,	

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Table 7

Western Europe: Selected Companies Dealing with Libya

Manufacturing and Service Companies

West Germany

BASF Brown Boveri & Compagnie Buckau-Walther AG. Detecon Kloeckner-Humboldt-Deutz Kutluat Liquid Gas Anlagen Siemens Thyssen Engineering **VEBA**

France

Air France BBC Brown Bouygues **EMH** Societe Internationale de Dessalement Societe Nationale Elf Aquitaine (Elf) Sofrerail Spie Batignolles **USINOR**

United Kingdom

Barkley Bank Brown & Root Brush Transformers Cubitt & Partners Imperial Chemical Industries (ICI) John Brown Offshore Motherwell Bridge Tilden Industries Transmark Weir Group

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Geos Ingenieur-Conseil Marc Rich Co. AG Sulzer Escher Wyss Unibuild

<u>Belgium</u>

Ateliers de Constructions Electriques de Charleroi Belgonucleaire Cockerill Electrobel Electrobel Engineering International Fabricom Tractionel

Austria

Voest-Alpine

Norway

Aircontact

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Manu	ufacturing and Service Companies (continued)
	Turkey
	Dogus Construction ENKA
	Temel Investigation
	Luxembourg
	TRATCO
Defe	ense Industries
	France
	Aerospatiale
	Construction Mecaniques de Normandie Dassault
	Electronique Marcel Dassault
	Engins Matra
	Matra SA
	Thomson-CSF TRT
	United Kingdom
	Alvis
	British Aerospace Dynamic Group
	Italy
	Augusta Bell
	Fiat Oto Molovo Spo
	Oto Melara Spa Siai-Machetti
	STAT-MACHECUT

West Germany

Commerzbank Deutsche Bank Dresdner Bank

France

Banque de Paris

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Financial Institutions (continued)		
<u>United Kingdom</u>		
Barclay's Bank Lloyds		
<u>Italy</u>		
Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Banca di Roma		
Netherlands		
Algemene Bank		
Austria		
Austrian Central Bank Creditanstalt Bankverein		
Norway		
Christiana Bank		
<u>Turkey</u>		
Akbank Garanti Bankasi Is Bankasi Pamukbank Ticaret Bankasi Uluslararasi Bankasi Vakiflar Bankasi Yapi ve Kredi Bankasi		
Greece		
Bank of Greece		
Malta		
Central Bank of Malta		
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	2	25 X 1